False-name manipulation refers to the question of whether a player in a weighted voting game can increase her power by splitting into several players and distributing her weight among these false identities. Analogously to this splitting problem, the beneficial merging problem asks whether a coalition of players can increase their power in a weighted voting game by merging their weights. Aziz et al. [ABEP11] analyze the problem of whether merging or splitting players in weighted voting games is beneficial in terms of the Shapley-Shubik and the normalized Banzhaf index, and so do Rey and Rothe [RR10] for the probabilistic Banzhaf index. All these results provide merely NP-hardness lower bounds for these problems, leaving the question about their exact complexity open. For the Shapley-Shubik and the probabilistic Banzhaf index, we raise these lower bounds to hardness for PP, "probabilistic polynomial time," and provide matching upper bounds for beneficial merging and, whenever the number of false identities is fixed, also for beneficial splitting, thus resolving previous conjectures in the affirmative. It follows from our results that beneficial merging and splitting for these two power indices cannot be solved in NP, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses, which is considered highly unlikely.
Introduction
Weighted voting games are an important class of succinctly representable, simple games. They can be used to model cooperation among players in scenarios where each player is assigned a weight, and a coalition of players wins if and only if their joint weight meets or exceeds a given quota. Typical real-world applications of weighted voting games include decision-making in legislative bodies (e.g., parliamentary voting) and shareholder voting (see the book by Chalkiadakis et al. [CEW11] for further concrete applications and literature pointers). In particular, the algorithmic and complexitytheoretic properties of problems related to weighted voting have been studied in depth, see, e.g., the work of Elkind et al. [ECJ08, EGGW09] , Bachrach et al. [BEM + 09], Zuckerman et al. [ZFBE08] , and [CEW11] for an overview.
Bachrach and Elkind [BE08] were the first to study false-name manipulation in weighted voting games: Is it possible for a player to increase her power by splitting into several players and distributing her weight among these false identities? Relatedly, is it possible for two or more players to increase their power in a weighted voting game by merging their weights? The most prominent measures of a player's power, or influence, in a weighted voting game are the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices. Merging and extending the results of [BE08] and [AP09] , Aziz et al. [ABEP11] in particular study the problem of whether merging or splitting players in weighted voting games is beneficial in terms of the Shapley-Shubik index [Sha53, SS54] and the normalized Banzhaf index [Ban65] (see Section 2 for formal definitions). Rey and Rothe [RR10] extend this study for the probabilistic Banzhaf index proposed by Dubey and Shapley [DS79] . All these results, however, provide merely NP-hardness lower bounds. Aziz et al. [ABEP11, Remark 13 on p. 72] note that "it is quite possible that our problems are not in NP" (and thus are not NP-complete). Faliszewski and Hemaspaandra [FH09] provide the best known upper bound for the beneficial merging problem with respect to the Shapley-Shubik index: It is contained in the class PP, "probabilistic polynomial time," which is considered to be by far a larger class than NP, and they conjecture that this problem is PP-complete. Rey and Rothe [RR10] observe that the same arguments give a PP upper bound also for beneficial merging in terms of the probabilistic Banzhaf index, and they conjecture PP-completeness as well. 1 We resolve these conjectures in the affirmative by proving that beneficial merging and splitting (for any fixed number of false identities) are PP-complete problems both for the Shapley-Shubik and the probabilistic Banzhaf index. Beneficial splitting in general (i.e., for an unbounded number of false identities) belongs to NP PP and is PP-hard for the same two indices. Thus, none of these six problems can be in NP, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to its first level, which is considered highly unlikely.
Preliminaries
We will need the following concepts from cooperative game theory (see, e.g., the textbook by Chalkiadakis et al. [CEW11] ). A coalitional game with transferable utilities, G = (N, v), consists of a set N = {1, . . . , n} of players (or, synonymously, agents) and a coalitional function v : P(N) → R with v( / 0) = 0, where P(N) denotes the power set of N. G is monotonic if v(B) ≤ v(C) whenever B ⊆ C for coalitions B,C ⊆ N, and it is simple if it is monotonic and v : P(N) → {0, 1}, that is, v maps each coalition C ⊆ N to a value that indicates whether C wins (i.e., v(C) = 1) or loses (i.e., v(C) = 0), where we require that the grand coalition N is always winning. The probabilistic Banzhaf power index of a player i ∈ N in a simple game G (see [DS79] ) is defined by
Intuitively, this index measures the power of player i in terms of the probability such that i turns a losing coalition C ⊆ N {i} into a winning coalition by joining it, and therefore is pivotal for the success of C. (For comparison, the normalized Banzhaf index of i in G defined by Banzhaf [Ban65] , who rediscovered a notion originally introduced by Penrose [Pen46] , is obtained by dividing the raw Banzhaf index of i in G , which is the term ∑ C⊆N {i} (v(C ∪ {i}) − v(C)) in (1), not by 2 n−1 , but by the sum of the raw Banzhaf indices of all players in G ; see [DS79, FM05, RR10] for a discussion of the differences between these two power indices.) Unlike the Banzhaf indices, the Shapley-Shubik index of i in G takes the order into account in which players enter coalitions and is defined by
Since the number of coalitions is exponential in the number of players, specifying coalitional games by listing all values of their coalitional function would require exponential space. For algorithmic purposes, however, it is important that these games can be represented succinctly. Simple games can be compactly represented by weighted voting games. A weighted voting game (WVG) G = (w 1 , . . . , w n ; q) consists of nonnegative integer weights w i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and a quota q, where w i is the ith player's weight. For each coalition C ⊆ N, letting w(C) denote ∑ i∈C w i , C wins if w(C) ≥ q, and it loses otherwise. Requiring the quota to satisfy 0 < q ≤ w(N) ensures that the empty coalition loses and the grand coalition wins. We use the following notation. Given a WVG G = (w 1 , . . . , w n ; q) and a nonempty 2 coalition S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, let G &S = (w(S), w j 1 , . . . , w j n− S ; q) with { j 1 , . . . , j n− S } = N S denote the new WVG in which the players in S have been merged into one new player of weight w(S). Similarly, given a WVG G = (w 1 , . . . , w n ; q), a player i, and an integer m ≥ 2, define the set of WVGs 
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Given:
A WVG G = (w 1 , . . . , w n ; q) and a nonempty coalition S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Question: Is it true that PI(
We distinguish between two splitting problems: In the first problem, the number m of false identities some player splits into is not part of the given problem instance (rather, the problem itself is parameterized by m), whereas m is given in the instance for the second problem. (This distinction wouldn't make sense for beneficial merging.)
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Given:
A WVG G = (w 1 , . . . , w n ; q) and a player i. 
PI-BENEFICIALSPLIT
Given:
A WVG G = (w 1 , . . . , w n ; q), a player i, and an integer m ≥ 2. 
The goal of this paper is to classify these problems in terms of their complexity for both the Shapley-Shubik and the probabilistic Banzhaf index. We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic complexity-theoretic concepts such as the complexity classes P and NP, the polynomial-time many-one reducibility, denoted by ≤ p m , and the notions of hardness and completeness with respect to ≤ p m (see, e.g., the textbook by Papadimitriou [Pap95] ). Valiant [Val79] introduced #P as the class of functions that give the number of solutions of the instances of NP problems. For a decision problem A ∈ NP, we denote this function by #A. For example, if SAT is the satisfiability problem from propositional logic, then #SAT denotes the function mapping any boolean formula ϕ to the number of truth assignments satisfying ϕ. There are various notions of reducibility between functional problems in #P (see [FH09] for an overview, literature pointers, and discussion). Here, we need only the most restrictive one: We say a function f parsimoniously reduces to a function g if there exists a polynomial-time computable function h such that for each input x, f (x) = g(h(x)). That is, for functional problems f , g ∈ #P, a parsimonious reduction h from f to g transfers each instance x of f into an instance h(x) of g such that f (x) and g(h(x)) have the same number of solutions. We say that g is #P-parsimonious-hard if every f ∈ #P parsimoniously reduces to g. We say that g is #P-parsimonious-complete if g is in #P and #P-parsimonious-hard. It is known that, given a WVG G and a player i, computing the raw Banzhaf index is #P-parsimonious-complete [PK90] , whereas computing the raw Shapley-Shubik index is not [FH09] , although it, of course, is in #P as well.
Gill [Gil77] introduced the class PP ("probabilistic polynomial time") that contains all decision problems X for which there exist a function f ∈ #P and a polynomial p such that for all instances x, x ∈ X if and only if f (x) ≥ 2 p(|x|)−1 . It is easy to see that NP ⊆ PP; in fact, PP is considered to be by far a larger class than NP, due to Toda's theorem [Tod91] : PP is at least as hard (in terms of polynomial-time Turing reductions) as any problem in the polynomial hierarchy (i.e., PH ⊆ P PP ). NP PP , the second level of Wagner's counting hierarchy [Wag86] , is the class of problems solvable by an NP machine with access to a PP oracle; Mundhenk et al. [MGLA00] identified NP PP -complete problems related to finite-horizon Markov decision processes.
Beneficial Merging and Splitting is PP-Hard
In this section we prove that beneficial merging and splitting is PP-hard, and we provide matching upper bounds for beneficial merging and splitting (for any fixed number of false identities) both for the Shapley-Shubik and the probabilistic Banzhaf index. We start with the latter.
The Probabilistic Banzhaf Power Index
We will use the following result due to Faliszewski and Hemaspaandra [FH09, Lemma 2.3].
Lemma 3.1 (Faliszewski and Hemaspaandra [FH09])
Let F be a #P-parsimonious-complete
The well-known NP-complete problem SUBSETSUM (which is a special variant of the KNAP-SACK problem) asks, given a sequence (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of positive integers and a positive integer q, do there exist x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ {0, 1} such that ∑ n i=1 x i a i = q? It is known that #SUBSETSUM is #P-parsimonious-complete (see, e.g., the textbook by [Pap95] for parsimonious reductions from #3-SAT via #EXACTCOVERBY3-SETS to #SUBSETSUM). Hence, by Lemma 3.1, we have the following.
Corollary 3.2 COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM is PP-complete.
Our goal is to ≤ p m -reduce COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM to Banzhaf-BENE-FICIALMERGE. However, to make this reduction work, it will be useful to consider two restricted variants of COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM, which we denote by COMPARE-#SUBSET-SUM-R and COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR, show their PP-hardness, and then reduce COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR to the problem Banzhaf-BENEFICIALMERGE. This will be done in Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 and in Theorem 3.5. In all restricted variants of COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM we may assume, without loss of generality, that the target value q in the related #SUBSETSUM instances ((a 1 , . . . , a n ), q) satisfies 1 ≤ q ≤ α − 1, where α = ∑ n i=1 a i , such that #SUBSETSUM remains #P-parsimonious-complete.
COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-R
Given:
A sequence A = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of positive integers and two positive integers q 1 and q 2 with 1 ≤ q 1 , q 2 ≤ α − 1, where α = ∑ n i=1 a i . Question: Is the number of subsequences of A summing up to q 1 greater than the number of subsequences of A summing up to q 2 , that is, does it hold that #SUBSETSUM((a 1 , . . . , a n ), q 1 ) > #SUBSETSUM((a 1 , . . . , a n ), q 2 )?
. . , 2αy n ), q 1 = q x , and q 2 = 2αq y . This construction can obviously be achieved in polynomial time.
It holds that integers from A can only sum up to q x < α −1 if they do not contain multiples of 2α, thus #SUBSETSUM(A, q 1 ) = #SUBSETSUM((x 1 , . . . , x m ), q x ). On the other hand, q 2 can only be obtained by multiples of 2α, since ∑ m i=1 x i = α is too small. Thus, it holds that #SUBSETSUM(A, q 2 ) = #SUBSETSUM((y 1 , . . . , y n ), q y ). It follows that (X ,Y ) is in COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM if and only if (A, q 1 , q 2 ) is in COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-R. ❑
In order to perform the next step, we need to ensure that all integers in a COMPARE-#SUB-SETSUM-R instance are divisible by 8. This can easily be achieved, since for a given instance ((a 1 , . . . , a n ), q 1 , q 2 ) , we can multiply each integer by 8, obtaining ((8a 1 , . . . , 8a n ), 8q 1 , 8q 2 ) without changing the number of solutions for both related SUBSETSUM instances. Thus, from now on, without loss of generality, we assume that for a given COMPARE-#SUBSET-SUM-R instance ((a 1 , . . . , a n ), q 1 , q 2 ), it holds that a i , q j ≡ 0 mod 8 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and j ∈ {1, 2}. Now, we consider our even more restricted variant of this problem.
COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR
Given:
A sequence A = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of positive integers. Question: Is the number of subsequences of A summing up to ( α /2) − 2 greater than the number of subsequences of A summing up to ( α /2) − 1, i.e., #SUBSETSUM((a 1 , . . . , a n ),
PROOF. Given an instance (A, q 1 , q 2 ) of COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-R, where we assume that A = (a 1 , . . . , a n ), q 1 , and q 2 satisfy a i , q j ≡ 0 mod 8 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and j ∈ {1, 2}, we construct an instance B of COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR as follows. (This reduction is inspired by the standard reduction from SUBSETSUM to PARTITION due to Karp [Kar72] .)
This instance can obviously be constructed in polynomial time. Observe that
and therefore, ( T /2) − 2 = 5α and ( T /2) − 1 = 5α + 1. We show that (A, q 1 , q 2 ) is in COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-R if and only if the constructed instance B is in COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR.
First, we examine which subsequences of B sum up to 5α. Consider the following cases: If 3α is added, 2α + 3 + q 1 + q 2 cannot be added, as it would be too large. Also, 2α + 1 − q 2 cannot be added, leading to an odd sum. So, 2α − q 1 has to be added, as the remaining α are too small. Since 3α + 2α − q 1 = 5α − q 1 , 5α can be achieved by adding some a i 's if and only if there exists a subset A ′ ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that ∑ i∈A ′ a i = q 1 (i.e., A ′ is a solution of the SUBSETSUM instance (A, q 1 ) ). If 3α is not added, but 2α + 3 + q 1 + q 2 , an even number can only be achieved by adding 2α + 1 − q 1 such that α − 4 − q 1 remain. So, 2α − q 1 is too large, while no subsequence of A sums up to α − 4 − q 1 , because of the assumption of divisibility by 8. If neither 3α nor 2α + 3 + q 1 + q 2 are added, the remaining 5α + 1 − q 1 − q 2 are too small. Thus, the only possibility to obtain 5α is to find a subsequence of A adding up to q 1 . Thus, #SUBSETSUM(A, q 1 ) = #SUBSETSUM(B, 5α).
Second, for similar reasons, a sum of 5α + 1 can only be achieved by adding 3α + (2α + 1 − q 2 ) and a term ∑ i∈A ′ a i , where A ′ is a subset of {1, . . . , n} such that ∑ i∈A ′ a i = q 2 . Hence, #SUBSETSUM(A, q 2 ) = #SUBSETSUM(B, 5α + 1).
Thus, the relation #SUBSETSUM(A, q 1 ) > #SUBSETSUM(A, q 2 ) holds if and only if #SUB-textscsetsum(B, 5α) > #SUBSETSUM(B, 5α + 1), which completes the proof. ❑
We now are ready to prove the main theorem of this section. Given an instance A = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR, construct the following instance for Banzhaf-BENEFICIALMERGE. Let α = ∑ n i=1 a i . Define the WVG G = (2a 1 , . . . , 2a n , 1, 1, 1, 1; α), and let the merging coalition be S = {n + 2, n + 3, n + 4}.
Letting N = {1, . . . , n}, it holds that
since the 2a i 's can only add up to an even number. The first of the four sets in (2) and (3) refers to those coalitions that do not contain any of the players n + 1, n + 3, and n + 4; the second, third, and fourth set in (2) and (3) refers to those coalitions containing either one, two, or three of them, respectively. Since they all have the same weight, players n+ 3 and n+ 4 have the same probabilistic Banzhaf index as player n + 2. Furthermore, the new game after merging is G &{n+2,n+3,n+4} = (3, 2a 1 , . . . 2a n , 1; α) and, similarly to above, the Banzhaf index of the first player is calculated as follows:
Altogether, it holds that
Banzhaf(G , i)
which is greater than zero if and only if
which in turn is the case if and only if the original instance A is in COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR. ❑
It is known (see [RR10] ) that both the beneficial merging problem for a coalition S of size 2 and the beneficial splitting problem for m = 2 false identities can trivially be decided in polynomial time for the probabilistic Banzhaf index, since the sum of power (in terms of this index) of two players is always equal to the power of the player that is obtained by merging these two players. Analogously to the proof of Theorem 3.5, it can be shown that the beneficial splitting problem for a fixed number of at least three false identities is PP-complete.
Since we allow players with zero weight, we need another simple fact for the analysis of the beneficial splitting problem to be used in the proofs of Theorems 3.7 and 3.10.
Lemma 3.6 For both the probabilistic Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index, given a weighted voting game, adding a player with weight zero does not change the original players' power indices, and the new player's power index is zero.
The proof of Lemma 3.6 is straightforward and therefore omitted. We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.7, which states that Banzhaf-m-BENEFICIALSPLIT is PP-complete for each m ≥ 3. The main difference between the beneficial merging and splitting problems is that before comparing the two #P functions associated with beneficial splitting, one has to choose a right way of distributing i's weight among the m false identities of i. Since m is fixed, there are only polynomially many (specifically, some number in O(w m i )) ways of doing so, i.e., of finding nonnegative integers w i 1 , . . . , w i m satisfying ∑ m j=1 w i j = w i . Thus, this comparison can be done in PP for each such weight distribution. As PP is closed under union, Banzhaf-m-BENEFICIALSPLIT is in PP.
In order to show PP-hardness for Banzhaf-3-BENEFICIALSPLIT, we use the same techniques as in Theorem 3.5, appropriately modified.
First, we slightly change the definition of COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR by switching ( α /2) − 2 and ( α /2) − 1. The problem (call it COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-R R ) of whether the number of subsequences of a given sequence A of positive integers summing up to ( α /2) − 1 is greater than the number of subsequences of A summing up to ( α /2) − 2, is PP-hard by the same proof as in Lemma 3.4 with the roles of q 1 and q 2 exchanged. Now, we reduce this problem to Banzhaf-3-BENEFICIALSPLIT by constructing the following instance of the beneficial splitting problem from an instance A = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of the problem COM-PARE-#SUBSETSUM-R R . Let G = (2a 1 , . . . , 2a n , 1, 3; α), where α = ∑ n j=1 a j , and let i = n + 2 be the player to be split. G is (apart from the order of players) equivalent to the game obtained by merging in the proof of Theorem 3.5. Thus, letting N = {1, . . . , n}, Banzhaf(G , n + 2) equals
Allowing players with weight zero, there are different possibilities to split player n + 2 into three players. By Lemma 3.6, splitting n + 2 into one player with weight 3 and two others with weight 0 is not beneficial. Likewise, splitting n + 2 into two players with weights 1 and 2 and one player with weight 0 is not beneficial, by Lemma 3.6 and since splitting into two players is not beneficial (by the remark above Theorem 3.7). Thus, the only possibility left is splitting n + 2 into three players of weight 1 each. This corresponds to the original game in the proof of Theorem 3.5, G i÷3 = (2a 1 , . . . , 2a n , 1, 1, 1, 1; α) . Therefore,
Altogether, as in the proof of Theorem 3.5, the sum of the three new players' probabilistic Banzhaf indices minus the probabilistic Banzhaf index of the original player is greater than zero if and only if
which is true if and only if A is in COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-R R . This result can be expanded to all m ≥ 3 by splitting into additional players with weight 0. More precisely, if m > 3, we consider the same game G as above and split into three players of weight 1 each and m − 3 players of weight 0 each. By Lemma 3.6, the sum of the m new players' Banzhaf power is equal to the combined Banzhaf power of the three players. Thus, PP-hardness holds by the same arguments as above. ❑
On the other hand, a PP upper bound for the general beneficial splitting problem cannot be shown in any straightforward way. Here, we can only show membership in NP PP , and we conjecture that this problem is even complete for this class. 
The Shapley-Shubik Power Index
In order to prove PP-hardness for the merging and splitting problems with respect to the ShapleyShubik index, we need to take a further step back. EXACTCOVERBY3-SETS (X3C, for short) is another well-known NP-complete decision problem: Given a set B of size 3k and a family S of subsets of B that have size three each, does there exist a subfamily S ′ of S such that B is exactly covered by S ′ ? Theorem 3.9 ShapleyShubik-BENEFICIALMERGE is PP-complete, even if only two players of equal weight merge.
PROOF. The PP upper bound, which has already been observed for two players in [FH09] , can be shown analogously to the proof of Theorem 3.5.
For proving the lower bound, observe that the size of a coalition a player is pivotal for is crucial for determining the player's Shapley-Shubik index. Pursuing the techniques of Faliszewski and Hemaspaandra [FH09] , we examine the problem COMPARE-#X3C, which is PP-complete by Lemma 3.1. We will apply useful properties of X3C instances shown by Faliszewski and Hemaspaandra [FH09, Lemma 2.7]: Every X3C instance (B ′ , S ′ ) can be transformed into an X3C instance (B, S ), where B = 3k and S = n, that satisfies k /n = 2 /3 without changing the number of solutions, i.e., #X3C(B, S ) = #X3C(B ′ , S ′ ). Now, by the properties of the standard reduction from X3C to SUBSETSUM (which in particular preserves the number of solutions, i.e., #X3C parsimoniously reduces to #SUBSETSUM, as well as the "input size" n and the "solution size" k), we can assume that in a given COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM instance each subsequence summing up to the given integer q is of size 2n /3. Following the track of the reductions from COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM via COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-R to COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR in Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4, a solution A ′ ⊆ {1, . . . , n} to a given instance A = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of the latter problem (A ′ satisfying either ∑ i∈A ′ a i = ( α /2) − 2 or ∑ i∈A ′ a i = ( α /2) − 1, where α = ∑ n i=1 a i ) can be assumed to satisfy A ′ = k = (n+2) /3. Under this assumption, we show PP-hardness of ShapleyShubik-BENEFICIALMERGE via a reduction from COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR. Given such an instance, we construct the WVG G = (a 1 , . . . , a n , 1, 1; α /2) and consider coalition S = {n + 1, n + 2}. Define X = #SUBSETSUM(A, ( α /2) − 1) and Y = #SUBSETSUM(A, ( α /2) − 2). Letting N = {1, . . . , n}, it holds that
Merging the players in S, we obtain G &S = (2, a 1 , . . . , a n ; α /2). The Shapley-Shubik index of the new player in G &S is
All in all,
Since we assumed that k = (n+2) /3 and we can also assume that n > 4 (because we added four integers in the construction in the proof of Lemma 3.4), it holds that n − 2k = n − 4 3 > 0.
Thus the term (4) is greater than zero if and only if Y is greater than X , which is true if and only if
A is in COMPARE-#SUBSETSUM-RR. ❑ Theorem 3.10 ShapleyShubik-m-BENEFICIALSPLIT is PP-complete for each m ≥ 2.
PROOF. PP membership can be shown analogously to the PP upper bound in the proof of Theorem 3.7. PP-hardness can also be shown analogously to the proof of Theorem 3.7, appropriately modified to use the arguments from the proof of Theorem 3.9 instead of those from the proof of Theorem 3.5. ❑ Theorem 3.11 ShapleyShubik-BENEFICIALSPLIT is PP-hard and belongs to NP PP .
PROOF. The upper bound of NP PP holds due to analogous arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.8. Also, analogously to the proof of Theorem 3.8, since ShapleyShubik-2-BENEFICIAL-Split is a special variant of the general ShapleyShubik-BENEFICIAL-SPLIT problem, PP-hardness is implied immediately by Theorem 3.10. ❑
Conclusions and Open Questions
Solving previous conjectures in the affirmative, we have pinpointed the precise complexity of the beneficial merging problem in weighted voting games for the Shapley-Shubik and the probabilistic Banzhaf index by showing that it is PP-complete. We have obtained the same result for beneficial splitting (a.k.a. false-name manipulation) whenever the number of false identities a player splits into is fixed. For an unbounded number of false identities, we raised the known lower bound from NP-hardness to PP-hardness and showed that it is contained in NP PP . For this problem, it remains open whether it can be shown to be complete for NP PP , a huge complexity class that by Toda's theorem [Tod91] contains the entire polynomial hierarchy. NP PP is an interesting class, but somewhat sparse in natural complete problems. The only (natural) NP PP -completeness results we are aware of are due to Littman et al. [LGM98] , who analyze a variant of the satisfiability problem and questions related to probabilistic planning, and due to Mundhenk et al. [MGLA00] , who study problems related to finite-horizon Markov decision processes.
Another interesting open question is whether our results can be transferred also to the beneficial merging and splitting problems for the normalized Banzhaf index. Finally, it would be interesting to know to which classes of simple games, other than weighted voting games, our results can be extended.
